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PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Pursuing my graduate wo rk at University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA) in 1965, I received a research
assistantship  from W arren A . Hall, then Director of the
Water Resources Center, and later my close friend and
collaborator.  Although both m y gradu ate degre es are in
Systems Engineering, my interest in the modeling,
planning, and management of water resources systems has
always inspired m y profess ional gro wth and  contr ibutions.
INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of water and related land system s, which
is due primarily to their large number of constituencies
and interdependent subsystems, is familiar to all those
practicing in the field.  In our qu est to mo del this
complexity, however, we have over the years developed
and adopted relatively manageable models that often
oversimplify some fundamental attributes of these
systems.  Most water distribution networks consist of a
vast number of interconnected components – e.g., the
distribution network, pumps, pipes, and treatment plants.
In addition, a hierarchy of institutional and organizational
structures – e.g., federal, state, county, a nd city – is
involved in the decisionma king process.  The degree of
physical and institutio nal coup ling that exists among the
subsystems (e.g., the budget constraint imposed on the
overall  system) fu rther com plicates their  modeling as well
as manag emen t.  In the maintenance of water distribution
systems, different replacement/repair strategies for
varying subsystems often have unexpected impacts on the
overall  system; th e dema nds for th e resourc es and the ir
approp riate allocations likewise have a diverse impact on
the system ’s reliability. 
The following statement seems as relevant today as it was
two decades ago (Haim es 1977):
 
In studying  large-scale  systems with techn ological,
societal, and env ironme ntal aspects, th e efforts in
the modeling as well as in the optimization
(solution of the system model) are magnified and
often overwhelm the analysis.  This is due to the
high dimensionality (very large number of
variables) and complexity  (non-linearity in the
coupling and interactions among the variables) of
the resulting mo dels.
When facing such a complex modeling task, it is natural
to tend to  aggregation and to reductionist mo deling tools.
Aggregation assumes sufficiently common characteristics
among the components to merit linking them in one class
or category .  Indeed, the essence of modeling consists of
selecting the appropriate level of aggregation and
reduction, modeling tools, time scale, physical scale,
system bound ary, m odel topology (e.g., level of non-
linearity), model param eters, represe ntative ob jectives and
constraints, the appro priate visio ns of the systems that
should  be modeled, and the appropriate metrics upon
which su ch mo dels are bu ilt.  
This paper will focus on five points.  These are the flaws
of four metrics when used in modeling water resources
systems without discrimination, plus the  unqualified use
of model optimization as a surrogate to system
optimization:
• Cost-be nefit analysis as a surrogate for genuine trade-
offs among multiple noncommensurate cost, bene fit,
and risk objectives.
• Expec ted value  of risk.  
• Present value of money.
• Reliability analysis as a surrog ate to risk analysis.
• The fallacy of optimization.
The f la w s i n  th e  m et ri c s s te m  from their
precommensurating inherent multiple objectives of
different dimensions b y lumping  them into  a single
objective, and thus curtailing mandated explicit trade-off
analyses.  These overly simplif ied metrics have become so
entrenched as measu res of efficien cy and e ffectivene ss in
the fabric of our ana lyses, that we commonly use them
without much discrimination and do not repeate dly
question their appropriatene ss or representativene ss.  This
paper aims to demonstrate that the first three of the four
metrics essentially convert inherent multiobjective
problems into a single objective one, and the fourth m etric
avoids explicit trade-offs altogether.  The last point
reflects on the misuse  of optimization in decisionmaking.
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COST -BEN EFIT  ANALYSIS AS A SURROGATE
FOR GENUINE TRADE-OFFS AMONG MULTIPLE
NONCOMMENSURATE OBJECTIVE S OF COSTS,
BENEFITS, AND RISKS 
Consider the following three representative water-
planning objectives for the Maumee River Basin study.
The fine-textured glacial tills and lake-deposited clays of
the basin have poor natural drainage, and the soil’s slow
permeability, intensive row cropping, and urban sprawl
are major contributors to soil erosion during heavy rains
(Haim es 1977 ): 
Minimize {f1 (x), f2 (x), f3 (x)} (1)
where x is a vector o f policy o ptions, f 1 (x) is the cost of
plan implem entation [d ollars], f2 (x) is soil erosion in the
basin  [tons], and f3 (x) is risk of flooded land [acres].
Clearly, a multiobjective framework, where Pareto
optima lity and trade-offs dominate the analysis, is the
most  appropriate method for (1) as indeed w as the case in
the Maumee study.  A single-objective analysis, on the
other hand, would replace the three objectives with one
single metric by  introduc ing weig hts to the system shown
in (1):
Minimize {p1 f1 (x)+ p2 f2 (x) + p3 f3 (x)} (2)
Whe re,   p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, p I $ 0,   i = 1, 2, 3 (3)
Note  that the Maumee planning board was much  more
concerned with the relative value of addition al increm ents
of the three noncommensurable objectives, at a given
value of each o bjective fu nction, th an i t was with their
absolute  values.  Fu rthermo re, given a ny curre nt set of
objective levels attained, it is much more meaningful and
effective for a planning board to assess the relative value
of the trade-off of the m arginal increases and decreases
between any two objectives than it is to assess their
absolute  average values.  Indeed, this view was endorsed
by participan ts from 4 2 coun tries who  attended  the 14 th
Conference of the Inter national S ociety for  Multiple
Criteria  Decision Making (MCDM ), which was hosted at
the University of Virginia in June 1998.  They presented
over 100 papers on the ever-growing importance of the
MCD M field. 
Single-objective analysis can be particularly flawed and
misleading, if not totally erroneous,  when risk (a measure
of the probab ility and severity of adverse effects) is traded
off with the cost of risk manage ment.  This is beca use
safety, the level of a cceptab le risk, is not absolute; it must
be traded off with the corresponding cost of risk reduction
(mana geme nt) as well  as with  other objectives on relative
as well as absolute values.  Equation (2) fails to provide
these imperative quintessential t rade-offs.  Although many
water experts h ave pion eered the  use of m ultiple
objectives in general and in water resources planning and
management in particular, many  studies rem ain hostage to
the single-objective paradigm when multiobjective
analyses are warranted.
EXPECTE D VALUE O F RISK
Risk is a measu re of the probability and severity of
adverse  effects.  One of the most d ominant steps in the
risk-assessment process is the quantification of risk, yet
the validity of the expec ted value, the m etric most
comm only  used to quantify risk, has received neither the
broad p rofession al scrutiny it  deserves nor the hoped-for
wider mathematical challenge that it mandates.   Consider,
for example, the concentration of the contaminant
trichloroethylene (TCE) in a ground water system,
measured in parts per billion (ppb).  Let px (x) denote the
probab ility density function of the random variable X,
E[x] denote the expected value of the containment
concentration measured in pbb (i.e., the risk of the ground
water being contaminated by an average concentration of
TCE),  and let the probability density function be
discretized into n regions over the entire universe of
contaminant concentrations as is presented by (4):
{f1 (x), f2 (x), . . . , fn (x)} (4)
Let p i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n,  represent the corresponding
probabilities of the contamination given by (4), where
p1 + p2 + . . . + pi = 1, p i $0,   i = 1, 2, . . . ,n (5)
Then the expected value of the risk of TCE contamination
of the groun d water system  is:
E[x] = p1 f1 (x)+ p2 f2 (x) + p3 f3 (x) (6)
Integration (instead of summation) can be used in (6) for
the continuous case.  Clearly, the system of equations (1)
to (3) are similar to the system of equations (4) to (6), and
in many respects, the expected valu e of risk is sim ilar in
its theoret ical-mathema tical constru ct to th e
commensuration of all costs, benefits, and risks into
monetary units as discussed in Section B.  In particular,
the expec ted -va lue  ope ra t ion  commen surate s
contamination (events) of low concentration and high
probab ility with contamination of high concentration and
low probability.  For exa mple, even ts f1 (x) = 2 ppb and f2
(x) = 20,000 ppb with the p robabilities p1 = 0.1  and p2 =
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0.00001, respectively, yield the same contribution to the
overall expected value of risk of contamination:
 
E[x] = (0.1) (2) + (0.00001)(20,000) = 0.2 + 0.2 (7)
However,  to the decisionmakers in charge, the relatively
low likelihood of a disastrous contamination of the ground
water system w ith 20,000 ppb of TCE cannot be
equivalent to contamination at a low co ncentratio n of 0.2
ppb, even with a very high likelihood of such
contamination.  Due to the nature of mathematical
smoothing, the averaging function of the contaminant
concentration in this exam ple does n ot lend itself to
prudent management decisions.  This is because the
expected value of risk  does not accentuate the catastroph ic
events  and their conseq uences,  thus misrepresenting what
would be perceived as unacceptable risk.
It is worth noting that despite the number of “good”
decisions managers mak e during their tenure, they are
likely to be penalized fo r any disastrous d ecisions they
make, no matter  how few.  The notion of “not on my
watch” stems from this truism.  In this an d other senses,
the expected  value of r isk fails to represent a measure that
truly com mun icates  the m anag er's or the d ecisio nma ker's
intentions and perceptions.  The conditional expected
value of the risk of extreme events generated by the
partitioned multiobjective risk method (PMRM ), when
used in conju nction with the (unconditional) expected
value, can ma rkedly co ntribute to  the total risk-
management approach (Asbeck and Haimes 1984, Haimes
1998).  A conditional expectation is defined as the
expected value of a random variable given that this value
lies within som e prespec ified range.  In this case, the
decisionmakers must make trade-offs not only between
the cost of preventing TCE contamination vs. the expected
value of such risk, but also between the cost of preventing
contamination vs. the conditional expected value of  risk
of an extreme level of TCE contamination.  Such a dual
multiob jective analysis provides the manager with mo re
comp lete, more  factual,  and less-aggregated information
about all viable policy options and their associated trade-
offs.  The conditional expected value of risk has been
widely  applied to dam safety and to numerous other
studies.
PRESENT VALUE OF MONEY
Most,  if not all, economic analyses of water resources
systems make use of the present value of money to bring
to a common denom inator funds expended or received at
different time periods.  Here again, while the present-
value concep t can be a v aluable m etric, it has been applied
indiscrim inately  across the board.  In its core, the  present-
value metric commensurates dollars of different values
into one index through the discount rate.  For a lender, the
discount rate used in such analyses is intended to account
for the opportunity loss of the use of money lent to others,
the risk of loss of the funds, and the rate of inflation,
among others.  The multidimensional characteristics of the
discount rate coupled  with the u se of a fixed  value in  the
commensuration process, raise a serious qu estion about
the proper and  uncondition al use of the prese nt-value as
a universal metric.
Let fi (x) represe nt a stream of n expenditures over n t ime
periods, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where x represents a set of policy
options.  Let r represent the discount rate used in the
analysis.  Then, th e present value of cost (PVC) for the
entire stream of expenditures is given by Equation (8):
PVC= (1 + r ) -1 f1 (x) + (1 + r )-2 f2 (x) + . . . 
 + (1 + r )-n fn (x)              (8)
Let p i = (1 + r )-i / 3  (1 + r )-i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n (9)
Where 3  p i = 1, and pi $ 0 (10)
Then, Eq uation (8) can b e rewritten as 
PVC = p1 f1 (x)+ p2 f2 (x) + p3 f3 (x) (11)
Since the system of Equations (2) and (11) are similar in
their mathem atical constru ct, argum ents made in Section
B against commensurating the objectives by the averaging
process, have some v alidity here  as well.  In essence, the
present value of monetary  costs and benefits constitutes a
single metric  that attempts to respond to the inherent
comp lexity and multiple purposes of water and related
land systems discussed in Sec tion A.  C learly, the un its
and dimensions of the expected value of risk are different
from those of th e present value of cost or b enefit;
nevertheless, the commensuration process is the same.
The limitation of the commensuration process in the
present value metric is often magnified when sustainable
development is of prim e concern.  In evaluating the
effects  of investments on the  regional e nvironm ent,
ecology, and socio econo mic well being, using the same
discount rate witho ut discrim ination is an implicit act of
precommensurating objectives of different u nits through
the convenience of the weighting approach.  Finally,
many argue that variable discount rates should be used for
different periods; howev er, this practice  is not com monly
followed bec ause of the new pro blems that it introduce s.
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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AS A SURROGATE FOR
RISK A NAL YSIS
The literature offers some confusion about the terms risk
and uncerta inty, and this  necessitates a restatement here of
their conventional  definit ions:  the term risk comm only
refers to a situation in which the potential outcomes can
be described in objectively kno wn pro bability
distributions.  The term uncerta inty commonly refers to a
situation in which no reasonable probabilities can be
assigned to the pote ntial outco mes.  Uncertainty is the
inability  to determine the true state of affairs of  a system;
it can be caused by incomplete knowledge or stochastic
variability .  Uncertainty caused by variability is a result of
inherent fluctuation s or differen ces in the q uantity  of
concern.  More precisely, variability occurs when the
quantity  of conc ern is not a sp ecific value but rather a
population of values (Haimes 199 8).
While reliability modeling has proven its usefulness for
designing and maintaining water infrastructures, the
following truths are often ig nored in  practice: (i)  complex
systems more often have not only one, but any number of
paths to failure, an d (ii) to know  the consequences of
failures is at least as important as to know failure
likelihoods.   Thus, the distinction between reliability and
risk is not merely a semantic issue; rather, it is a major
element in resource allocation and management decisions
throughout the life cycle of water reso urces systems
(whether in design, construction, operation, maintenance,
or replacement).  Risk was defined earlier as a measure of
the probability and sev erity of adverse effec ts.
Unreliability, is only a measure of the probability that the
system does not meet its intended functions.  In other
words,  unreliability  does not include the consequences of
failures, whereas risk as m easure of the probability and
consequences of the adverse  effects, is inclusive and thus
more representative.  Clearly, not all failures can
justifiably  be prev ented at all co sts.  Thus, sy stem
reliability  cannot c onstitu te a viable metric for resource
allocation, unless  an a priori level of reliability has been
determined.  This bring s us to the du ality between risk and
reliability  on the one hand, and multiple objectives and a
single objective optimization on the other.
In the mu ltiple-objec tive mod el, the level o f acceptab le
reliability  is associated with the corresponding
consequences (i.e., constituting  a risk mea sure) and  is thus
traded off with the associated cost that would reduce the
risk (i.e., impro ve the reliab ility and/or reduce the adverse
effects).  In the single-objective model, on the other hand,
the level of acc eptable re liability is not exp licitly
associated with the co rrespon ding co nseque nces; rathe r it
is often predetermined by individuals who become
anonymous over the years (or the re liability is
parametrically evaluated) and  thus is considered as a
constraint in the mo del.
There are, of course, both  historical and evolutionary
reasons as well as substantive and functional justifications
for the more common use of reliability analysis rather
than risk analysis.  Historically, engineers have always
been concerned with strength of materials, durability of
produ ct, safety, surety, and ope rability of various system s.
The concept of risk as a quantitative measure of both the
probab ility and conseq uences (or adverse effects) of a
failure has evolved relatively recently.  From the
substantive-functional perspective, however, many
engin eers or decisionmakers cannot relate to
amalgamating two diverse co ncepts with differen t units –
probabilities and consequences – into one concept termed
risk.  Nor do they  accept the me tric with which risk  is
commonly measured.  The common metric for risk (as
discussed earlier – the expected  value of an ad verse
outcome) essentially comm ensurates events of low
probability and high consequence s with those of high
probab ility and low  conseq uences.  In this sense, one may
find basic philoso phical justifica tions for en gineers to
avoid  using the risk metric and instead w ork with
reliability.  Furthermore and most importantly, dealing
with reliability does not require the engineer to make
explicit  trade-offs between cost and the outcome resulting
from structural or product failure. Thus, design engineers
isolate themselves from the social consequences that are
byproducts of the trade-o ffs betwe en reliability  and cost.
The design of levees for flood protection may clarify this
point furth er.  
Designating a “one-hundred-year return period” means
that the engineer will design a flood-protection levee for
a predetermined water level that on the average is not
expected to be exceeded more than once every hundred
years.   Here, ignoring the soc ioeconom ic consequen ces,
e.g., loss of lives and property damage due to a high
water-level that might exceed the one-hundred -year return
period, the design engineers shield themselves from the
broader issues, such as risk to the population’s well-being.
On the other hand, addressing the multiobjective
dimension that the risk metric brings requires much closer
interaction and coordination between design engineers
and decisionmak ers.  In this case, an interactive p rocess is
required to reach acceptable levels of risks, costs, and
benefits.  In a nutshell, com plex water resou rces issues,
especially  those invo lving public policy with health and
socioeco nomic  dimensions, should not be addressed
through overly simplified models and metrics.  With the
increasing reliance on  superviso ry contro l and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems in water resources
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management, and as the demarcation line between
hardware and software slowly, but surely, fades away, and
with the ever-evolving and increasing role of design
engineers and systems analysts in technology-based
decisionmaking, a new p aradigm  shift is emer ging.  Th is
shift is characterized by a strong overlapping of the
responsibilities of engineers, exe cutives, and less-
technically-trained w ater systems ma nagers.
The likelihood of multiple or comp ound fa ilure mo des in
water resources systems (as well as in other physical
systems) adds another dimension to the limitations of a
single reliability metric for a water infrastructure (Park et
al.,  1998, Lambert et al., 1996).  Indeed, because one
must address m ultiple reliabilities o f a system , the need
for explicit trade-offs among risks and costs becomes
more critical.  Compound failure modes are defined as
two or more paths to failure with consequences that
depend on the occurrence of com binations of failure
paths.  Consider the following examples: (a) a water
distribution system, which can fail to pro vide ade quate
pressure, flow volume, water quality, and other needs; (b)
the navigation channel of an inland waterway, which can
fail by exceeding the dredge capacity and by closing to
barge traffic; and (c) highway bridges, where failure can
occur from deterioration of the bridge deck, corrosion or
fatigue of structural elements, or an external loading such
as flood.  Water quality could be used as another basis for
the reliability of the water distribution system.  None of
these failure modes is independent of the others in
probab ility or consequence.  For example, deck cracking
can contribu te to structura l corrosio n.  Structural
deterioration in turn can increase the vulnerability of the
bridge to floods;  nevertheless, the individual failure
modes of bridges are typically analyzed in isolation of one
another.  Acknowledging the need for multiple metrics of
reliability  of capacity, pressure, hydraulic capacity (joint
requirem ents for flow volume and pressure in the system),
or quality could markedly improve decisions regarding
maintenance and rehabilitation, especially when  these
multiple re liabilities are aug mented  with risk m etrics.  
THE FALLACY OF OPTIMIZATION
Since metrics and systems modeling are the focus of th is
paper, it seems appropriate to briefly address the
“solution” of models: namely, systems optimization.
Quantitative analysis in water-resource systems
engineering heavily re lies on mathematical models, which
in turn, are assumed to represent reasonably well the
essence of the water system under study.  The objective
function (or functions in multiobjective analysis) is often
the driving force in these mod els, and an y “optim al”
solution derived is clearly dependent on the assumptions
that are embedded in the representation of the objective
functions,  constraints, a nd inpu t-output r elationships.  The
term “optim al solution”  essentially refers to the best
solution of the mathem atical model un der all assumption s,
whether explicitly  assumed, intentionally excluded, or
inadver tently omitted.  Clearly, the model optimal
solution may be far from, or totally unrelated to the actual
system’s optimal solu tion.  The n how  should
mathematical models be used as a valuable tool in the
decisionmaking process? 
Obviously, mathematical models should not substitute for
the decisionmaking process; rather, they are a tool.  They
can be very  valuable  in genera ting future p ossible
outcomes under c ertain con ditions and  assump tions.  In
multiobjective analysis, where the concep t of optim ality
is expanded into Pareto optimality, generating model
Pareto  optimal plans can be invaluable in identifying
specific  characteristics and attributes of the water system.
In sum, recognizing that the term “optimal solution”
pertains on ly to the model and not necessarily to the real
system would  help diffuse some of the misgivings among
practitioners and help to develop a more sober attitude on
the part of th e mod elers and a nalysts. 
EPILOGUE
During the past three decades the consideration of
multiple  objectives in modeling and decisionmaking has
grown by leaps and bounds.  The eighties in particular
have seen the emphasis shift from the dominance of
single-objective modeling and optimization toward an
emphasis on mu ltiple objectiv es.  In particu lar,
multiobjective analysis has emerged as a philosophy that
integrates common sense with empirical, quantitative,
normative, descriptive, and value-judgment-based
analysis.  It is a philosophy that is supported by advanced
systems concepts (e.g., data management procedures,
modeling methodologies, optimization and simulation
techniques,  and decisionmaking app roaches) that are
grounded on both  the arts and the sciences for the ultim ate
purpo se of imp roving th e decision makin g proce ss. 
Modeling constitutes the road map that guides the analyst
throughout the journey of water-resources planning,
design, and management, and it may be viewed through
many spectacles depending on the analyst’s perspectives,
vision, and circumstances.  Metrics are the building blocks
of modeling; therefore, their appropriateness and
representativeness  in any specific model are the sine qua
non for good modeling and ultimately as an effective tool
for decisionmaking.  In particular, the optimum doesn’t
exist in an objective sense  per se.  An “optimum” solution
to a real-life problem depends on myriad factors, which
include who the decisionmakers are, wha t their
perspectives are, what the biases of the modeler are, what
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the credibility of the database is, etc.  Theref ore, a
mathematical optimum to a mo del does n ot necessa rily
correspond to the optimum for the real- life problem.
This article is an attempt to highlight some of the flaws in
the metrics used in modeling, focusing on recognizing the
importance of multiobjective modeling and ana lysis.  This
argument is particularly critical in risk assessment and
mana geme nt, where trade-offs among all important and
relevant costs, benefits, and risks must be considered
within  a multiob jective fram ework .  Today, with man-
made hazards such as terrorism and cyber-tampering
added to natural threats such as floods an d earthquak es,
analyzing risk within a multiobjective framework is not
just an option – it is imperative.
REFERENCES
Asbeck, Eric,  and Yacov Y. Haimes. 1984. “The
Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method,” Large S cale
Systems, Vol.6, No. 1, 13-38.
Haimes,  Yacov  Y. 197 7. Hierarchical Analyses of Water
Resources Systems: Modeling and Optimization of
Large-S cale Systems. McGraw-Hill Book Company,
NY.
Haimes,  Yacov  Y. 199 8.  Risk Modeling, Assessment, and
Mana gemen t, John Wiley & Sons, NY.
Lambert, James H., Lori R. Johnson, and Yacov Y.
Haimes.  1996.  “The Imp act of Multiple Failure
Modes in Risk Ana lysis for Civil Infrastructure
Mana geme nt,” Risk-Based Decision Making in Water
Resources VII , Y. Y. 
Haimes, D. A. Moser, and E. Z. Stakhiv. Ed. American
Society o f Civil En gineers, N Y. 
Park, Joshua I.,  James H. Lamb ert, and Yaco v Y. Haim es.
1998. “Hydraulic Power Capacity of Wate r
Distribution Networks in Uncertain Conditions of
Deteriora tion,” Water Resources Research,  Vol. 34,
No. 12, pp.3605-3614.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Warren A. Hall, one of the principal founders of UCOWR.
